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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of equitable principles on the sphere of commercial law. It will make particular 
reference to the effect of the incursion of equity on ordinary creditors with regard to obtaining priorities in cases of 
insolvency. It will analyze the Quistclose trust and show how this type of trust may be used to obtain an advantage by 
those who would otherwise be ordinary creditors. It will refer to the use of equitable tracing to recover assets in a 
money-laundering scheme The paper will suggest that judicial acceptance of the concept of the remedial constructive 
trusts has enhanced the development of proprietary restitutionary remedies in commercial transactions where no 
proprietary remedy would have previously existed. 
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Steve Hedley once described a school of thought which suggested that such a vague conception as equity, with is ‘oddly 
moralistic concepts’ and refusal to ‘fit itself into neat categories’ deserved to be put out of its misery. He said: ‘If some 
say that equity is dying, then the fact must be admitted – but so is the common law. The great legal innovations today 
are statutory, not common law; when new law is needed, it is made by the legislature….’(Note 1) He concluded his 
observations by saying that while the common law is still with us equity is needed, although how long the common law 
would be with us was anyone’s guess. 
This way of looking at equity sees it as having a corrective function, interjecting its doctrines in places where the 
common law is found to be lacking. But although equity may have begun in that way, through ancient Chancellors 
dispensing equity’s justice in the face of a defective common law system, today’s equity has taken on a larger role and 
recently has seemed to be making incursions into a hitherto restricted zone. Equity is being utilized for the imposition of 
equitable principles in commercial situations and we are witnessing the judicial use of those principles to support 
decisions where fiduciary relationships are imposed upon people linked by contract, and trust concepts protect funds for 
the benefit of unsecured lenders in the face of obligations owed by debtors to their ordinary creditors. This paper looks 
at what is being done in the name of equity by the judiciary to change the nature of relationships in the commercial 
world and at the protection of the interests of unsecured transferors of property to the detriment of the creditors of 
insolvent transferees. 
There are two avenues I wish to explore through the medium of this paper, which may appear at first sight to be 
disparate threads of enquiry. Yet I believe, and I hope to show, that the two are linked. I am referring to the increasing 
use that is being made of the so-called Quistclose trust (Note 2) and the implementation of the proprietary remedy 
which in New Zealand is known as the remedial constructive trust. I also wish to discuss the differences between 
making judicial rulings based on principle, or the balance of competing rights, and rulings based on policy 
considerations. In using these two strategies, the Quistclose trust and the remedial constructive trust, the courts are able 
to discover proprietary interests in commercial transactions. If I were analysing the decisions in a jurisprudential sense I 
would call upon Dworkin’s theory of judicial interpretation. Dworkin would tell us that the judiciary is either 
establishing one party’s rights to be greater than another’s based on principle or else they are making decisions to 
redistribute property based on some policy consideration. Dworkin would also say that this latter process of grounding 
decisions in policy lies outside the purview of the judiciary in any case. Either way, what the judges are doing is 
broadening the application of equity and changing the way property is held in an area of law dominated by statute, 
somewhat giving the lie to Mr. Hedley’s idea that change is the province of parliament through legislation. 
Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose Investments Ltd(Note 3) (hereafter Quistclose) was based on a line of cases that formed 
a precedent for the proposal that when property was transferred to a debtor for the repayment of that debt the property 
should be returned to the transferor if the debt was not repaid. As early as 1806, in the case of Hassall v Smithers(Note 4)
money was provided for payment of specific bills. The debtor died intestate without paying the bills and the provider of 
the money, together with those bill holders, was able to compel the intestate’s personal representatives to use the money 
provided for the specific purpose(Note 5). By the middle of the 19th century a slightly broader had become established. 
Where money had been lent to a debtor to pay off his pressing creditors and it was made clear that the money could not 
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be used for any other purpose, the money lent for that purpose became ‘clothed with a specific trust’ (Note 6). This was 
the judgment of Abbott CJ in 1819 in the case of Toovey v Milne. It was decided that, if, before the money was paid to 
creditors, the debtor became bankrupt, that money had to be repaid to the lender. The trustee in bankruptcy would be 
bound by an ‘implied stipulation’ (Note 7) to return it and the money would not become part of the debtor’s assets. This 
reasoning was applied in Edwards v Glyn(Note 8) in 1859 and became a well established principle in cases involving 
personal bankruptcy. Lindley LJ in Re Rogers (Note 9) went so far as saying: 
‘I entertain no doubt that [the lender] could have obtained an injunction to restrain the bankrupt from using that money 
for any purpose except that of paying his pressing creditors.  
That being the case the money could not vest in his trustee as part of his assets as the debtor never had the beneficial 
interest in the money. 
It was not until Quistclose in 1970 that the House of Lords applied this line of authorities in the context of corporate 
insolvency. Now we have a situation where lenders use the Quistclose trust to protect themselves against the risks 
inherent in their borrowers becoming insolvent and thus absolving themselves from the necessity of taking security for 
their loans. In examining the concept behind the doctrine, several questions arise as to the nature of the Quistclose trust. 
It may be a type of proprietary remedy, and if that is the case we will be able to show an express trust to have been 
created so that the transferee may be said to have never enjoyed the beneficial interest in the transferred property.  
It may be a type of purpose trust which for some reason is not declared void for want of certainty of object. Perhaps it is 
analogous with the doctrine spelt out in Re Denley(Note 10) which was a purpose trust that would have been void for 
lack of beneficiaries but was saved by being found to be for the benefit of individuals. I will come back to this idea. 
Another possibility is that the Quistclose is a constructive trust and if it is what sort of constructive trust could perform 
its functions. Again, I shall return to the idea of a constructive trust being at the heart of the doctrine found in 
Quistclose.
The case itself is fascinating and it’s one I use to stir up enthusiasm for equity and trusts in my classes. I use it as an 
example of what a trust can accomplish, even when we are not sure if it is in fact a trust. I use it as an example of how 
the devious and well informed can overcome the ordinary shareholders, workers and ordinary creditors of a firm that 
continued trading even though its managing director ought to have known it had long since passed the brink of 
bankruptcy. The man behind the company is also fascinating in the way he was able to get away with so much for so 
long.  
As you will know, the Quistclose case was brought by Barclays Bank who wanted to use money they held in an account 
for a company called Rolls Razor to offset an unauthorised overdraft amount. In June 4 1964 Rolls Razor owed 
Barclays Bank 484,000 pounds whereas its overdraft limit was set at 250,000 pounds. Barclays Bank was actually in the 
best position of all as it had taken a security against the plant and factory valued at 4 million pounds. In May 1964 the 
managing Director of the company, John Bloom, persuaded his Board to declare a generous dividend at a time when the 
company’s accounts showed a loss of 179,000 pounds for the first three months of 1964. It has been suggested that even 
this figure does not represent the true amount of the deficit. A subsidiary electronics firm was close to collapse. The 
Board was for the most part in a state of denial as far as the financial position of the company was concerned. The 
paperwork was in a state of chaos but they knew that a cash injection was needed and it was suggested by one director, 
Jack Jacobs, that unless money was forthcoming the board should recommend liquidation. In order to meet the payment 
of the dividend Bloom approached Sir Isaac Wolfson, who was referred to mysteriously as Mr X in the Court of Appeal 
judgment of Harman LJ. Sir Isaac Wolfson had a vested interest in keeping Rolls Razor going. The firm was 
manufacturing and selling washing machines. Wolfson’s finance company was providing the Hire Purchase finance 
which enabled ordinary people to buy the new washing machines which were sold door to door at heavily discounted 
prices. They were very popular and while people entered hire purchase agreement, Wolfson was making money. The 
figure suggested was one million pounds which was to come from Wolfson’s company, General Guarantee Corporation. 
However the money was transferred to Quistclose Investments Ltd by Bloom himself. It was a shell company and the 
source of the money has never been properly documented. Most people believed it was Wolfson, through General 
Guarantee Corporation, others say it was Barclays Bank, although this was unlikely. Whatever the source Bloom’s 
confidence soared and he was convinced that a financial hurdle had been overcome.  
At this point I want to elaborate on something Robert Stevens said, in his chapter entitled ‘Rolls Razor Ltd’(Note 11) in 
‘The Quistclose Trust: Critical Essays’ that John Bloom went to the school ‘labelled by some sections of the press as 
the worst school in Britain’. While it is true that the school that now occupies the site of Bloom’s old school on the edge 
of Hackney Downs was closed in 1995, having been shown to be an educational disaster, that school was not the one 
Bloom attended. John Bloom went to the Grammar School which was originally on the site. It was known locally as 
The Grocers’ School and was in fact inaugurated by the Worshipful Company of Grocers in 1876. Entry was by 
examination only and only the brightest of students could attend. It was a hugely successful School with an enviable 
reputation and alumni that includes playwright, Harold Pinter; writer and actor, Steven Berkoff; physicist, Cyril Domb 
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and world darts champion Eric Bristow. Sir Michael Caine also attended the school for a while in the 1940s, as did my 
cousin Professor Gough who is at the University of Cambridge. John Bloom wasn’t the wild boy from the East End of 
London some sources try to portray, instead he was intelligent and had entrepreneurial skills for which, for some time, 
he was respected. 
In July 1964 Quistclose Investments Ltd wrote a cheque in favour of Rolls Razor for nearly 210,000 pounds. When the 
cheque was sent to Barclays Bank it was accompanied by a note. The instruction to the bank was that the money should 
be paid into a separate account and held for Rolls Razor for the purpose of paying the declared dividend. It is believed 
that during the negotiations with Sir Isaac Wolfson a stipulation was raised that the loan was conditional on the 
dividend being paid. The payment into the Rolls Razor account was sufficient to boost Bloom’s confidence that all 
would be well to the stage where he felt comfortable taking a holiday in Bulgaria where his yacht was moored. 
Arranging holidays in Bulgaria was another of Bloom’s entrepreneurial schemes, called Rolls tours, and it must be 
admitted that, as terrible as the holidays sounded, with hours of coach travel through communist countries, they were 
the start of the modern package holiday.  
This of course was a terrible mistake. Without their charismatic managing director to guide them, the board accepted 
the advice of a financial adviser (who had been very well paid in advance for his services) that the company should be 
immediately wound up voluntarily on the grounds that it was hopelessly insolvent. When Bloom returned from Bulgaria 
three days later he had no choice but to accept what had been decided in his absence. It was at this point that Barclays 
informed Rolls Razor that it intended to exercise its power and combine the overdrawn account with the share dividend 
account and the Quistclose case as we know it began. 
I have gone into a lot of background detail to illustrate the point that if indeed a trust was being created by this sequence 
of events the company which would benefit from the trust is Quistclose Investments Ltd which was a shell company, 
under the control of John Bloom, who supplied the money that was lent to Rolls Razor. The reason for the elaborate 
arrangement to ensure the dividend was paid was not altruistic regard for the shareholders, but rather was part of a 
larger scheme to ensure that financial support was forthcoming from a party who was intimately concerned for the 
continuation of Rolls Razor to ensure his own profits did not diminish. The immediate effect of the loan was to make 
the company appear to be solvent, when it clearly was not. All of these factors are inherently repugnant to equity yet 
none of this was discussed by the House of Lords. Nor was the issue raised as to why the shareholders were no longer 
represented by the time the case was heard by the Lords.  
Unlike the earlier nineteenth century cases the concern was not for the fulfilment of the purpose of the loan but instead 
the protection of the lender. The House of Lords was persuaded that the financial arrangements surrounding the transfer 
of the funds clothed the funds in a trust and imposed a fiduciary obligation on the one who held the money (Barclays 
Bank) to return the funds to the transferor (Quistclose). Usually a trust will be declared with the consent of the parties 
unless the trust is imposed as the result of circumstances. (Note 12) Although a chose in action can undoubtedly serve 
as the subject matter of a trust the problem remains as to the identities of the settlor, trustee and beneficiary.  
If we say that Quistclose Investments Ltd was the settlor we may say that Rolls Razor acted as trustee and the chose in 
action was created when Rolls Razor deposited the money into the Barclays account which Rolls had received from 
Quistclose. However Lord Wilberforce disagrees with this analysis, preferring Barclays Bank in the role of trustee. He 
asks (Note 13) whether Barclays Bank has notice of the terms upon which the loan was made. This is a difficult point to 
overcome if we are to accept the arrangement as a trust since one cannot be a trustee of money that is owed to another 
and in its relationship with Rolls Razor the bank merely holds the money under a contractual duty to the depositor, not 
as trustee. If on the other hand Rolls Razor is the trustee, we must look for a declaration of trust by Quistclose which 
showed an intention to vest rights in Rolls Razor as trustee, rather than as outright owner. The only indication we have 
of any restriction is the note that accompanied the deposit, saying that the fund was to be used for the payment of the 
dividend. But that note came from Rolls Razor, not Quistclose, although Lord Wilberforce appears to ascribe the same 
intention to Quistclose Investments Ltd. (Note 14), although the proviso was never declared by that company.  
Whoever expressed the intention, and whether or not it can be ascribed to Quistclose Investments Ltd, there still 
remains the problem that by stipulating where and how the funds should be applied is not the same as creating a trust. 
There are many examples of cases where a transfer encumbered with a condition for its use was declared not to 
constitute a trust. (Note 15) The stated purpose can only serve to define the subject matter of the trust or show the 
motive behind the transfer; it does not of itself create a purpose trust. Even if it was capable of creating a purpose trust 
there are huge obstacles to overcome to avoid the purpose trust from being declared void for lack of a human 
beneficiary. This is a topic to which I shall return.  
The issue of keeping the transferred funds in a separate account has been identified in some cases as crucial to the 
finding of a Quistclose trust (Note 16), but Quistclose Investments did not impose any duty of segregation over the 
money. The bank was advised by Rolls Razor to keep the money in a separate account but this stipulation did not come 
from Quistclose Investments. One may ask whether the absence of such a stipulation from the lender allowed the 
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borrower to take the benefit of the transfer absolutely. A larger issue is that of identifying a beneficiary of any trust that 
may exist. 
Peter Millett wrote about the issue prior to his elevation to the Bench in ‘The Quistclose Trust: Who Can Enforce It?’ 
(Note 17) in which he found the result to be ‘simple and orthodox’.(Note 18) He saw the Quistclose arrangement as a 
bare trust accompanied by a mandate to use the money for a specified purpose. When the purpose of the mandate failed 
(to pay the dividend) the express trust protected the rights of the lender and ensured that the money was returned to him. 
So for Peter Millett the Quistclose trust is not remedial, there is no need for a resulting trust nor should a constructive 
trust arise. The Quistclose trust merely gives effect to the wishes of the settlor, Quistclose Investments Ltd. This view 
has certainly been adopted in New Zealand by the Court of Appeal in General Communications Ltd v Development 
Finance (Note 19) and in Australia in the High Court: in Australasian Conference Association Ltd v Mainline 
Constructions Pty Ltd (1978) (Note 20) Gibbs ACJ, with whom the other two members of the majority of the court 
agreed, said at page 353 that Quistclose: 
"is authority for the proposition that where money is advanced by A to B, with the mutual intention that it should not 
become part of the assets of B, but should be used exclusively for a specific purpose, there will be implied (at least in 
the absence of an indication of a contrary intention) a stipulation that if the purpose fails the money will be repaid, and 
the arrangement will give rise to a relationship of a fiduciary character, or trust." 
The analysis appears to be very neat, but it is not without some inherent difficulties. 
In comparison to General Communications (above) where the money was transferred for the purchase of equipment, 
Templeton Insurance Ltd v Pennington Solicitors LLP(Note 21) was a case concerning the transfer of funds for the 
purchase of specific land. When the purchase was not completed Lewison J considered that there was a Quistclose trust 
but the beneficial ownership was to remain with the transferor. The trust was analysed as a resulting trust accompanied 
by a power to use the money for a purpose. Lewison J did not consider it necessary for there to be crystal clarity as to 
the restricted purpose intended by the settlor, as long as it could be shown that the money was not intended to be at the 
free disposal of the recipient. 
There is some confusion as to whether it is crucial that the settlor attaches clear stipulations to the funds that are being 
transferred. In EVTR(Note 22) Dillon LJ accepted ‘that nobody gave a conscious thought’ to the proposition that the 
purpose for which the money was being advanced (to purchase equipment) might not be fulfilled. Still, despite this, 
Dillon LJ found there to be a proprietary interest in the lender’s favour. My question would be: how could any settlor 
intend to create a trust if he gave no thought to it? There are other, wider issues. One such is whether the obligation 
borne by the borrower in that case should be any more than a personal obligation to return the money. Furthermore 
where did the proprietary interest originate? But for me the biggest consideration is how a court could infer an intention 
to create a trust when the lenders themselves did not recognise the importance of reserving a proprietary right over the 
money to protect them from the possibility that the borrower might become bankrupt, which in turn would expose the 
lender to risks. 
For Dillon LJ these considerations constituted no barriers to his findings. He said,  
‘A constructive trust most normally arises by implication of law when circumstances happen to which the parties had 
not addressed their minds.’ 
This leaves me to wonder whether Peter Millett’s earlier analysis was abandoned by EVTR since Millett’s theory was 
concerned with express trusts, not resulting or constructive trusts. However the two positions are linked since it is 
probable that a resulting trust will arise when an express trust fails. However I come back to my main objection to the 
analysis of the position in EVTR in that it is absurd to talk of inferring an express trust from a loan arrangement when 
the lender had not given any consideration at all to the advantages that an express trust would bring. In the express trust 
analysis the lender seems to somehow mysteriously acquire all the powers of a beneficiary under an ordinary express 
trust. If this were the case the lender would have acquired the power to revoke the loan and bring it to an end whether or 
not there was any default under the ordinary common law powers of a beneficiary who is sui juris and in control of the 
whole beneficial interest. This power would go far beyond the power to restrain the borrower from making unauthorised 
use of the money. 
It would appear to make more sense if the analysis of Dillon LJ were viewed as the creation of a remedial constructive 
trust. This proprietary remedy has become increasingly popular in New Zealand. In New Zealand we have embraced the 
notion of fusion between law and equity more readily than in England or Australia and the courts are more likely to be 
ready to find a remedial constructive trust in order to give a remedy when principles of justice and good conscience 
require it. The remedial constructive trust is a very attractive device. Lord Browne-Wilkinson has hinted that the way 
forward for English law may involve the recognition of remedial constructive trusts and in the Westdeutsche case(Note 
23) he went so far as to explain the difference between the institutional and remedial constructive trusts.  The main 
difference is that in the circumstances of the institutional constructive trust the proprietary interest exists before the 
Journal of Politics and Law                                                            September, 2009
15
plaintiff comes to court and the court just gives effect to a trust which arose out of specific circumstances. However, the 
remedial constructive trust gives rise to a previously non-existent proprietary interest at the discretion of the court to 
reverse some injustice.
As early as 1949 Sir Alfred Denning (as he then was) gave the first Hamlyn Lecture in which he identified the challenge 
facing the court as being to develop ‘new and up-to-date machinery’. In his judgment of the previous year, Nelson v 
Larholt (Note 24) he said,  
“It is no longer appropriate, however, to draw a distinction between law and equity …. Remedies now depend on the 
substance of the right, not on whether they can be fitted into a particular framework. The right here is not peculiar to 
equity or contract or tort, but falls naturally within the important category of cases where the Court orders restitution, if 
the justice of the case so requires”(Note 25)  
In 1972 during Lord Denning’s term as Master of the Rolls, in his judgment in Hussey v Palmer(Note26) Lord Denning 
made the remark that the resulting trust and the constructive trust ‘run together’. ‘By whatever name it is described,’ he 
said, ‘it is a trust imposed by law whenever justice or good conscience require it.’ He went on to say, ‘It is a liberal 
process, founded upon large principles of equity, to be applied in cases where the defendant cannot conscientiously 
keep the property for himself alone’. 
In 1990 Aquaculture Corp v NZ Green Mussel Co Ltd (Note 27) was decided by the New Zealand Court of Appeal and 
in this case the court formulated the ‘basket of remedies’ approach. The aim was to make as full a range of remedies 
available as possible so that a remedy might be chosen because it is appropriate without having to consider whether its 
origin was in common law, equity or statute. This decision signalled the New Zealand Court of Appeal’s willingness to 
focus on the outcome of a particular case rather than the theoretical foundations of the remedy so the remedy could be 
chosen on the basis that it provides the best outcome not because the antecedents of the remedy arose out of equity or 
the common law or even indeed from statute. 
Parties who considered themselves to be in a contractual, non-fiduciary, relationship may find they are bound to 
undertake all the rigorous duties that are demanded of a trustee and money they regarded as profit becomes the subject 
matter of a hitherto unsuspected trust. For example in the case of Dickie v Torbay Pharmacy (1986) (Note 28) in 1995, a 
fiduciary relationship was found to exist between potential joint venturers. When a breach of the fiduciary duty 
occasioned the finding of a proprietary remedy, the remedial constructive trust was applied. Hammond J considered the 
nature of a constructive trust and concluded that ‘functionally constructive trusts can, and do, serve a variety of 
purposes’. He came to the conclusion that abstract theory should give way to the circumstances of a given case, the 
nature of the wrong and whether proprietary relief is appropriate. Equity affords the judge the opportunity to protect 
property by way of a constructive trust and force the disgorgement of money to the party who has been wrongly denied 
it. In New Zealand it makes no difference whether the parties were engaged in a commercial enterprise which would 
normally have been governed by a contractual relationship, the equitable remedy is available.  
So if we were to apply the remedial constructive trust to the Quistclose trust it would work in the following way. The 
money advanced by Quistclose Investments Ltd would have been impressed by a trust by way of the intended use to 
which the funds were to be put. If the intended purpose was not and could not be fulfilled it would be unconscionable 
for Rolls Razor to keep the funds (albeit that they were in the hands of Barclays Bank) and it could even be seen as an 
unjust enrichment on the part of Rolls Razor if the funds were not returned. One huge disadvantage of this analysis is 
the fact that by appealing to a court in equity all the maxims of equity come into play. The remedy is discretionary and 
depends upon, amongst other things, the equitable nature of the lender’s claim. If the lender has a vested interest in 
deceiving the public as to the true financial position of the borrower and if the borrower were to be shown as trading 
while insolvent, it is very unlikely that equity will look very kindly on either the lender or the borrower to the extent of 
applying an equitable remedy.  
Perhaps there is another possible analysis of the case. Perhaps the Quistclose arrangement might be seen as being a 
particular kind of express trust which falls outside the requirement to show certainty of object, that is to say to show that 
there is a human beneficiary rather than just a purpose to which the money should be used. In Quistclose the emphasis 
is placed on the purpose which has been impressed upon the transferred money and I think it is easy to overlook the 
problem of discovering who the beneficiaries of the trust are. If the shareholders are identified as the beneficiaries of an 
express trust then the answer is clear – simply find the company’s list of shareholders and distribute the money. 
However that is said to be impossible since the company no longer exists. A trust needs beneficiaries who can enforce 
the trust as against the trustees. If the shareholders are not the beneficiaries then it is a purpose trust and, not being a 
charitable trust, it should be declared void. The whole idea of a resulting trust coming into play when an express trust 
fails will only work if there is an express trust to begin with.  
There was an attempt in Giles v Westminster Savings Credit Union (Note 29) in the British Columbia Supreme Court 
where Sigurdson J tried to clothe a Quistclose – like arrangement with the three certainties required for the 
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establishment of an express trust. This attempt was doomed to failure as an express trust requires certainty of intention 
and it was impossible to show a clear intention by the parties that the beneficial interest was to remain in the lender.  
Another approach to the issue of where the beneficial interest lies in the Quistclose trust comes from an Australian case, 
Australian Elizabethan Theatre Trust(Note 30) in which Gummow J said that, while the borrowers remain solvent, they 
hold the interest for the benefit of the creditors. Once the borrowers are insolvent the property returns to the lender by 
way of a gift over. This analysis is hard to accept because if the creditors have the beneficial interest in the property it is
difficult to see how this is terminated on the insolvency of the borrowers.   
If there is no certainty of object or certainty of beneficiary there can be no trust unless we can bring the Quistclose trust
in line with a case from 1969 called Re Denley’s Trust Deed(Note 31) (hereafter Denley). The settlor in Denley wanted 
to provide sports and recreation facilities for his employees and their families and friends. He transferred funds to 
trustees with the instructions as to their duties. The trust was challenged as being a non-charitable purpose trust and 
therefore void for not having human beneficiaries. Goff J overcame the problem by taking the approach that the Denley 
trust lay outside the mischief of the beneficiary rule. In other words this was an exception to which the beneficiary rule 
need not be applied. In any case the court found that there was in fact a trust for persons, simply expressed as a trust for 
a purpose. If we could apply that reasoning to Quistclose we may be able to overcome some of the problems inherent in 
finding a valid trust if we simply say the case falls outside the mischief envisaged by the beneficiary rule requirements. 
This was the conclusion reached by Ho and Smart. (Note 32)
In this way Quistclose would simply step into the anomalous class of extraordinary trusts that are not void for lack of a 
beneficiary. Trusts for the upkeep of tombs and graveyards fall into this class as do trusts for the maintenance of packs 
of hunting hounds and stables of racehorses. If the purpose fails then a resulting trust is imposed and the subject matter 
of the trust returns to the transferor. In Re Westar Mining Ltd (Note 33) it was assumed by the court that the Quistclose
trust is a purpose trust, in fact the two were treated as being synonymous. Mutual intention to create a trust was found to 
exist so that money in a bank account was found to be impressed with the trust and not available to the mine’s creditors. 
The issue of lack of certainty of beneficiaries was not discussed. It was assumed that this type of trust was outside the 
mischief for which the rule relating to beneficiaries was created. 
However it is a rather large step to take from the accepted exceptions to the beneficiary principle which enable the 
courts to allow trusts for tombs or beagles, to the Quistclose trust which allows funds in a bankrupt’s bank account to be 
shielded from the claims of creditors. Even if we proceed via Denley it seems to be stretching the bounds of reasoning 
by analogy. In Denley there were humans who would benefit from the trust, in Quistclose the shareholders cannot 
benefit from a company that is no longer trading. In Denley there is no doubt about who are the trustees and there is no 
doubt about the settlor’s intentions. In Quistclose the restrictions on the use of the money did not come from the settlor 
but from another party. It cannot be said that the settlor made its intentions clear. There is also doubt about who the 
court thought was the trustee, Rolls Razor or Barclays Bank. My final objection to analysing Quistclose as a Denley 
type trust is that in Quistclose the trust concept is being used to disgorge money in a kind of action for restitution.  
If we reject the purpose trust analysis then we may favour the interpretation of Potter LJ in Twinsectra v Yardley (Note 
34) where he described the arrangement as an ‘express pupose trust’. Adopting an analysis of Peter Gibson J in 
Carreras Rothmans Ltd v Freeman Matthews Treasure Ltd (Note 35) Potter LJ said, ‘as long as the primary purpose 
trust continues, the beneficial interest in the monies lent is “in suspense” until applied for that purpose.’ (Note 36) There 
are several examples of cases where that approach seems to have been applied. From the Alberta Court of Queen’s 
Bench in 2003 comes the case of Reed v Toronto-Dominion Bank.(Note 37) Master Funduk was trying to resolve the 
issue of what happened to $75,000 that Reed gave to purchase certain shares. In answering a question as to whether the 
money was the subject matter of a trust, Master Funduk responded’ 
‘If money is given to be used only for a specific purpose it is today called a Quistclose trust.’ (Note 38) 
And having thus established the trust he went on to make two of the defendants liable in knowing assistance in the 
breach of the trust because the shares were not bought with the trust money. Master Funduk had no difficulty with the 
notion that the beneficial interest could be held in suspense in this way and if not applied for the specified purpose 
would crystallise in favour of the plaintiff. 
In another Canadian case, this time from the British Columbia Supreme Court in 2004 Mr Zhou met Ms Wang in a 
massage parlour and was so taken with her that he gave her some money to pay off her husband. She said she was in an 
arranged marriage for the purpose of acquiring Canadian residence and was indebted to her husband. This money was 
said by the court to be under a trust following Quistclose, as the money was advanced for a special purpose and thus 
became impressed with a trust for the purpose. (Note 39) Ms Wang did not enjoy the beneficial ownership of the money 
and when the money was not used for the purpose of paying off her husband the beneficial interest that had been in 
suspense vested once more in Mr Zhou. 
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It would appear that, whatever its theoretical basis, the Quistclose trust is being applied on the broad jurisdiction of 
equity in many common law countries. The questions with regard to the difficulty in adhering to the beneficiary 
principle seem to have been forgotten.  
During later years it would appear that the original reasoning in Quistclose has been expanded. It is not clear exactly 
when this happened but certainly in 1988 there is evidence that the Quistclose principle remained limited to its original 
parameters. For example in Re Miles; Ex parte National Australia Bank Ltd v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy which 
was heard in the Federal Court of Australia (Note 40) it was held that the principle in Quistclose is limited to situations 
where money is paid to the payee for the purpose of discharging debts and that purpose fails. 
This original version of the principle expounded in Quistclose was correctly supported by precedent from the nineteenth 
century. However by 2002, in the words of Lord Millett in Twinsectra. (Note 41)  
‘Money advanced by way of a loan normally becomes the property of the borrower……….But it is well established that 
a loan to a borrower for a specific purpose gives rise to fiduciary obligations on the part of the borrower which a court 
of equity will enforce. In the earlier cases the purpose was to enable the borrower to pay his creditors, or some of them, 
but the principle is not limited to such cases’.
The expanded version is now being relied upon to enable transferred property to be returned to the transferor in many 
varied situations without the benefit of a sound basis of precedent or conceptual certainty. The situations vary from case 
to case but all of the instances are based on the words of Lord Millett cited above. For example there was the case of a 
Greek wife who managed to reclaim her lottery winnings of 2 billion drachmas after her husband had taken it out of 
their joint account to set up a foreign exchange margin account in the UK on the basis that when she placed the money 
in the account it was impressed with a Quistclose trust. Accordingly the proceeds could be traced into the new, US 
dollar bank account and members of the bank’s staff were found to be liable for knowingly assisting the husband in 
breach of the trust. (Note 42)  
Whereas in Miles (above) the court found that there was no trust over a bankrupt’s funds, in 2002,Kennedy v Bohnet 
(Note 43) when in a bankrupt held a deposit in his account for the purchase of a golf course, the court found there to be 
‘an express Quistclose trust… The $ 400,000 was to be used for a specific purpose only and if it was not used for that 
purpose it was to be returned.’ The Quistclose trust has been used as the equitable interest forming the basis upon which 
to lodge a caveat (Note 44) but for the most part the greatest use has been in the area of insolvency. For example the 
case of Glen Eight Pty v Home Building Pty Ltd (Note 45) concerned a transfer of funds into a mixed bank account. The 
court was able to discern that the funds paid in by the defendant were impressed with the purpose of paying the 
contractors and that was sufficient to merit the imposition of the Quistclose trust. 
In the same court, in the same year the Supreme Court of New South Wales appears to has come to its own definition of 
the Quistclose trust in Frontier Touring Co Pty Ltd v Rodgers (as liquidator of Kidz.net Services Pty Ltd (in liq)) (Note 
46) where it was stated:
‘It is unconscionable for a man to obtain money on terms as to its application and then disregard the terms on which he 
received it. Such conduct goes beyond a mere breach of contract….In the present case, as I have already said, the 
relationship of the plaintiff and Kidz.net was not that of lender and borrower. In conceptual terms, the plaintiff may be 
regarded as having settled funds on Kidz.net so that Kidz.net might apply them in the manner stated. This, to my mind, 
reinforces the applicability of the resulting trust principles referred to in Twinsectra. The plaintiff paid money to 
Kidz.net (and Kidz.net accepted it from the plaintiff) for a stated purpose, so that Kidz.net came to hold the money upon 
trust to apply it for that purpose and, in default, to hold it for the plaintiff. Clearly implicit in the trust was a duty on the
part of Kidz.net not to apply the money otherwise than in fulfilment of the stated purpose. That duty was accordingly a 
fiduciary duty.’
I think this is a most comprehensive analysis with, I believe, all the elements from the different ways of explaining the 
Quistclose trust. We have the unconscionablity of the remedial constructive trust, the plaintiff as settlor of funds, and a 
resulting trust. We have the element of the purpose trust with a trust crystalising in the event of default and a fiduciary 
duty not to misapply the funds. This analysis adheres most closely with the fundamental principles of the trust, created 
by the Court of Equity to work on the conscience of the transferee and in my view is the best way of looking at the 
Quistclose trust. 
Flexibility has always been prized by Equity but the note of caution is often sounded that too much flexibility leads to 
uncertainty and too much discretion is judicial anarchy. However, if a wrong is identified where no remedy as yet 
would give relief it seems that it is the very essence of equity that all available sources should be used to find a remedy.  
Even in criminal cases, for example involving money laundering, principles of equity are being called upon to recover 
funds. For example PBM (HK) Ltd v Tang & Ors (Note 47) was a case an employee who utilised accounts of his 
employer’s clients to engage in money laundering practices. The profits from his illegal activities were passed to his girl 
friend, with whom he was living, and placed in her bank account. Although she did not take part in the money 
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laundering it was held by the court that she ‘must have known’ that her boyfriend could not have come by such large 
amounts of money legally. Plus she knew that her boyfriend had a slavish lifestyle which he could not have maintained 
on his salary. These facts, said the court, were enough to trigger the equitable principle of tracing. She was not 
prosecuted, and her own dishonesty was not proven, just that of her boyfriend. The court assumed her knowledge of the 
dishonest activities of Tang and was prepared to use equitable principles to disgorge the money from her account.  
Equity is commonly used in this pragmatic way to provide the courts with a remedy that perhaps otherwise would not 
be available. So it is with the Quistclose trust. While the roots of the conceptual analysis of Quistclose remain open to 
debate, in many courts the practical ramifications of that conceptual uncertainty are being eroded, particularly in 
commercial cases. Perhaps it is sometimes felt necessary to impart some sense of morality into cases involving 
businessmen or sometimes the reason is pragmatic, simply to find the most suitable remedy for the situation.  
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